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RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI
Politicization and Judicialization of the U.S. Chief
Executive's Political and Criminal Responsibility: A
Threat to Constitutional Integrity or a Natural Result
of the Constitution's Flexibility?
This article attempts to analyze to what extent the scope of exec-
utive privilege, constitutionally committed to the executive branch, is
determined by judicial process or by purely political factors. It opens
with a brief report on the process of formation of the Presidential
model of government and the system of checks and balances in the
United States. Focusing on the checks imposed on the Executive, this
article distinguishes those restraints that are clearly constitutional-
ized, or stemming from judicial determination of their constitutional-
ity, and those which are the result of judicial interpretation of the
beneficial aspects of public policy or political decisions of the Con-
gress. It then concludes with the observation that the flexibility built
into the Constitution by ambiguous language or simply by the gaps
left by the Framers, does not always result in a healthy process of the
parliamentary implementation of the Constitution. In contrast, such
ambiguities actually may lead to awkward political meddling with
the constitutional concept of presidential government, affecting the
integrity of the Constitution.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
Distribution of the Powers of Government'
The failure of the American Confederation was quite obvious in
February 1787, when Congress recommended that the May Conven-
tion in Philadelphia would consider revising the Articles of Confeder-
ation. The new Constitution was to "be adequate to the exigencies of
RETr R. LuDwIKowsKi is Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative and Inter-
national Law Institute of the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America.
1. Some of the comments in this subchapter have been taken from the author's
book, Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance 198-206 (1996)
and the article "Mixed Constitutions-Product of an East-Central European
Constitutional Melting Pot," 16 B. U. Int'l L. J. 7-11 (1998).
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government and the preservation of the Union."'2 Finding some pat-
terns that could be duplicated or developed in the new system was,
however, a formidable challenge for the delegates to the Convention.
The constitutional framers realized from the initial meetings that
they would have to take a "new-way" approach to government mak-
ing, and their reliance on existing theory or practice might be only
limited. In The Federalist No. 9, Alexander Hamilton wrote about
the new tasks,
"The regular distribution of power into distinct departments;
the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the insti-
tution of courts composed of judges holding their offices dur-
ing good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are
wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal pro-
gress towards perfection in modern times. They are means,
and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican
government may be retained and its imperfections lessened
or avoided."3
In fact, the idea that governmental checks and balances are es-
sential to free institutions and that power must be divided among
several branches to avoid an arbitrary government was not entirely
new. The origins of the division of powers doctrine can be traced to
the Aristotelian or Polybian concept of mixed political systems. Such
a system which was characterized by the blending of elements of a
monarchy, an aristocracy and a democracy, and distributing govern-
mental functions among several organs was to contribute to the social
and political stability of the government's structures. The roots of the
modern division of powers, however, are not derived directly from the
Aristotelian concept. For the authors of the modern version of this
doctrine, Locke and Montesquieu, the real rationale for the distribu-
tion of power was not so much the improvement of the government's
stability through distribution of its functions; the evil they feared
most was an absolute arbitrary authority.4 Thus, the concept of a
government whose power is limited through its diffusion among sev-
eral organs is a fundamental component of the modern doctrine of
division of powers. Wherever this principle is constitutionally recog-
nized, we may find some reception of the Lockean or Montesquieuean
doctrine.
Thus, the new approach of the framers of the American Constitu-
tion did not stem from the total lack of doctrinal antecedents, but
2. Quoted after T.M. Cooley, The General Principles of the Constitutional Law in
the United States of America (1891), at 15.
3. A. Hamilton, Federalist No. 9, ed. Clinton Rossiter (1961), 72-73.
4. John Lock wrote, "Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled
standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government."
J. Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government 186 (W.S. Carpenter ed., 1970).
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from the awareness that an Aristotelian, Lockean or Montesquean
model of government fits the needs of the rising American Union only
to a limited extent. For example, John Locke listed three powers in
the British Commonwealth: legislative, executive, and federative.
Locke, however, suggested that supreme power lay in the legislative
branch, and he did not recognize the judiciary as a separate power.
Montesquieu, "the oracle always consulted and cited on this subject,"
enumerated the judiciary among "powers,"5 but he believed that in
fact it is no "power" at all. He wrote that "of all three powers of which
we have spoken, the judicial is, in a sense, null."6
It addition to this, it was obvious that despite Montesquieu's ref-
erence to the English system, the powers in the English model were
not distributed in the way described by him. They were neither equal
nor well separated. The seventeenth-century struggle between the
Crown and the Parliament culminated in the adoption of the Bill of
Rights (1688) and the Act of Settlement (1700), which confirmed the
supremacy of the legislature. 7 The cabinet members were sitting in
the Parliament, and they simultaneously carried on executive and
legislative functions; the House of Lords was carrying some judicial
functions. If the division of powers was to mean that none of the pow-
ers could accumulate all basic functions-legislative, executive, and
judicial-the application of this doctrine to the English system was,
at least, questionable. As Wade and Bradley wrote: "in many conti-
nental constitutions separation of powers has meant an unhampered
Executive; in England it means little more than an independent
Judiciary."8
In revolutionary France, the idea that functions of the govern-
ment should be diffused was also implemented in a rather different
way than the Framers of the American system envisioned a separa-
tion of powers system. The principle of the division of powers in
France was associated to a large degree with the idea of the separa-
tion of powers in that the organs of government and their functions
were actually separated. The emphasis was put on different roles
within the divisions and not on a collaborative effort between
powers.9
5. James Madison, Federalist No.47, op.cit. at 301.
6. Cappelletti, "Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Justice," Cath. U. L. Rev. 35 (1985): 11, 12-14. See also Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Laws (1989) at 160.
7. For more details on the processs of the formation of parliamentary supremacy,
see E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional Law (8th ed. 1970), at 38-61.
8. Id. at 25.
9. Arthur T. von Mehren and James R. Gordlay wrote, "The leaders of the
French Revolution saw the principle (of separation of powers) in more abstract and
conceptual terms./... / Each power was entirely independent of the others; collabora-
tion between powers was forbidden, and theoritically, unneccessary because each had
been delegated the fragment of the national sovereignty necessary. to discharge its
functions." The Civil Law System (1977), 217, n.3.
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Thus, it was clear that the system of checks and balances, which
was on minds of some of the fifty-five delegates who attended the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, was different in several
ways than European models or concepts. Although the American
model did not require, in strict sense, the equality of powers, it em-
phasized their "equilibrium," a "sharing" of functions, and a "hamper-
ing" of one power by another. A different team of people ran each
organ, but their functions were to some extent blended and often
overlapping. As enumerated by John Adams, the checks and balances
were to be as follows:
"First, the States are balanced against the general govern-
ment. Second, the House of Representatives is balanced
against the Senate, and the Senate against the House.
Third, the executive authority is in some degree balanced
against the legislature. Fourth, the judiciary is balanced
against the legislature, the executive and the State govern-
ments. Fifth, the Senate is balanced against the president in
all appointments to office, and in all treaties. Sixth, the peo-
ple hold in their own hands the balance against their own
representatives by periodical elections. Seventh, the legisla-
tures of the several States are balanced against Senate by
sexennial elections. Eight, the electors are balanced against
the people in the choice of President and Vice President. And
this, it is added, is a complication and refinement of balances
which is an invention of our own, and peculiar to this
country."' o
The Position of the President
The development of the concept of the presidential power was
even more difficult. In the center of attention of political philoso-
phers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the relation-
ships between monarchs and representative bodies. The role and
functions of the executive in republican systems were not a subject of
any extensive dispute." In European Monarchies the Ministers
worked on behalf of the Kings who were recognized as the source of
the sovereign power. 12 The evolution of a cabinet government and
10. Colley, supra n. 2, at 187.
11. "The Framers floundered in dealing with these questions because neither the-
ory nor practice was of much help," wrote J. M. Burns, Presidential Government
(1965), at 5.
12. In France and England, where the American Framers looked most for some
features which they could borrow, the position of a prime minister was fully formed in
the seventeenth century. The prime ministerships of Richelieu or Mazarini in France
were well established. Similar position of prime minister emerged in England in time
of George I, who was often absent from the debates of his cabinet and relied heavily
on his administrators selected to preside the meetings. Wade & Bradley, supra n. 7, at
44-45.
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dual executives, with Monarchs being the heads of states and Prime
Ministers working as heads of governments, was not, however, espe-
cially helpful for post-colonial leaders trying to develop their system
in opposition to European monarchic traditions.
The domestic experience seemed to be more applicable to the
"new" needs of the Union of several American States. In some of the
North American colonies (New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina) the officers who moderated the meetings of the king's councils
were elected and called "presidents" and, since the first meetings of
the Continental Congress in the fall of 1774, its presiding officers
were holding the same title. This practice resulted in the tendency of
calling the elected chiefs of republican political entities "presidents".
The question that remained to be answered was the scope of the
presidential power. The first and more elaborate conception of this
office came from Alexander Hamilton. He presented his views to the
delegates of the Convention on June 18, 1787.13 His concept of presi-
dential authority was there described as follows:
"The supreme Executive authority of the United States (was)
to be vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during
good behavior-the election to be made by Electors chosen
by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid-the author-
ities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a
negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of
all laws passedj ... /
All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution
or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better
to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour or presi-
dent of each state shall be appointed by the General Govern-
ment and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be
passed in the State of which he is governour or President."1 4
Hamilton's political concepts were not enthusiastically accepted
by the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention who believed that his
federal government would eliminate the States and that the presi-
dent, being elected for life, would accumulate almost autocratic
power, which would in turn create a monarchy The provisions of the
Constitution on the President's scope of power, which were approved
by the delegates in response to the Hamiltonian vision, provided for
the chief executive elected only for a limited term and chosen by elec-
tors. The President's veto was still powerful but more limited than in
the Hamilton's concept. Foreign policy powers of the President were
wide and his control over other executive officers was extensive.
13. Bums, supra n. 11, at 6.
14. S.J. Konefsky, John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton (1964), at 37-38. For
more details on The Hamilton Plan, see M. Ferrand, Records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, Vol. 3, 1966, (Appendix F), at 617-30.
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The real scope of prerogatives of the Chief Executive Officer was
to be shaped by the first "vital" Presidents. 15 In fact, Hamilton him-
self played an important role in this process, with respect to at least
one feature of the emerging system. The Constitution as crafted in
Philadelphia did not mention the President's Cabinet or have any
provisions allocating special powers to one of the Cabinet members.
With Jefferson serving as the first Secretary of State in President
Washington's cabinet, however, the chances that this position might
be converted into an equivalent of European prime ministership were
quite substantial. Yet Hamilton, as Secretary of Treasury, at least
pretended to play this role himself. Competing with Jefferson, he
worked efficiently against any tendency to incorporate institution of
premiership into the American system.
The lack of a dual executive remained one of the most important
features distinguishing the American "presidential" system from
other, namely "parliamentary," model of divided government. The
other main difference was impossibility of the legislature and execu-
tive to terminate each other's political lives. In result, aside from pe-
riodic elections, the impeachment process became the main
instrument of enforcement of political responsibility of the President,
Vice-President and civil officers of the United States.
Development of Impeachment-Philadelphia Convention and the
Ratification of the Constitution
Article II Section IV of the Constitution is short. It states "The
President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States
shall be removed from office in impeachment for and conviction of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
Although, almost each single word of this provision was subject
to extensive judicial and doctrinal interpretation, the information
about the conceptual origins of the American impeachment is not
overwhelmingly abundant. The delegates to the Philadelphia Con-
vention did not want to influence "the People" and decided to keep
their discussions, to some extent, in secret. 16 In this manner, most of
the information on the formation of the institutions fundamental to
the American system stemmed from constitutional disputes during
the ratification period, especially those collected in the brilliant series
of articles, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John
Jay, known as "The Federalist Papers." In fact, Madison, recognized
often as the main source of information about constitutional debates,
15. Burns, supra n. 11, 8-31.
16. M. J. Gerhardt,'Federal Impeachment Process. A Constitutional and Histori-
cal Analysis 3-4 (2000).
[Vol. 50410
A THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
had numerous objections about using the 'original intent' approach 17
to constitutional interpretation. He published his notes on constitu-
tional debates many years after the conclusion of the ratification pro-
cess.18 Having said this, it is possible, however, to identify some
concerns the delegates to the Convention and early defenders of the
Constitution of the United States had in their minds.
First, the prevailing opinion was that the institution of American
impeachment should depart from the English model19. In England,
the House of Commons could impeach any person before the House of
Lords with exception of the Monarch, and impeachable conduct was
any high crime or misdemeanor.20 The practice has shown that these
acts had usually a political flavor but could be punished by death,
imprisonment or a heavy fine.2 ' As Wade and Bradley wrote:
"Before the full development of ministerial responsibility im-
peachment was a useful weapon enabling the Commons to
call to account Ministers appointed by and responsible to the
Crown/.../ By the Act of Settlement 1700 a pardon from the
Crown cannot be pleaded in bar of an impeachment, but it is
nevertheless open to the Crown to pardon one who has been
successfully impeached. '22
In contrast to this practice, the American Framers believed that only
the public officers could be subject to impeachment, and that they
might be removed from the office, 23 and that eventually the courts
should impose criminal penalties.
Second, the Framers could not agree to what extent the judicial
structures should participate in impeachment processes. Edmund
Randolph suggested in his Virginia Plan that the impeachment
should be left in the hands of judiciary. 24 Gouverneur Morris, how-
ever, argued "the Supreme Court were too few in number and might
be warped or corrupted."25 Hamilton agreed with him that the Con-
gress would be the best institution to decide in the cases dealing with
"the abuse or violation of some public trust."26 This concept was, how-
ever, opposed by Charles Pinkney, who believed that the Senate
17. "Original intent" approach refers to the position of so called "originalists," the
commentators relying on the interpretation process mostly on studying original con-
stitutional history. See, W.A. Kaplin, The Concepts and Methods of Constitutional
Law (1992), at 23.
18. Gerhardt, supra n. 16, at 4.
19. E. Field Van Tassel & P. Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses (1999), at 82.
20. Wade and Bradley, supra n. 7, at 314.
21. R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1973), at 67-73
22. Wade and Bradley, supra n. 7, 314-15.
23. For early debates on this issue see, T.M. Ferrand, Records of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, 1966, Vol. 2, at 64,65.
24. Gerhardt, supra n. 16, at 5.
25. Ferrand, supra n. 23, at 551; see also Tassel at Finkelman, supra n. 19, at 17.
26. Id. 19.
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would gain too much leverage over the President.27 As a result of
these agonizing disputes, on the proposal of the Committee of Eleven,
presented on September 4, the House was given the right to impeach,
and the power to try was reserved for the Senate.28
Third, the question of who might be impeached inspired some
attention. Gouverneur Morris argued that the executive magistrates
should be impeachable including chief executive officer "who is not
the King but the prime-Minister."29 Morris was, however, concerned
that the President might be left excessively dependent on the legisla-
ture. The Framers finally reached the consensus that the Presidents
and Vice-Presidents should be subject to impeachment but they paid
very little attention to the issue of whether other officials may be sub-
ject to impeachment. The reference to "Civil officers of the U.S. who
might also be removed from office on impeachment and conviction"30
was thereby left without further explanation.
Fourth, the problem of votes required for successful impeach-
ment was vividly discussed but did not inspire a major controversy.
Hugh Williamson proposed on June 6 that all effective acts of the
Senate would require two thirds majority, and on September 8, Mor-
ris moved that "no person shall be convicted without the concurrence
of two thirds of the members present: and every member shall be on
oath."31 The problem of a required majority was resolved without a
major dissent.
Fifth, the issue, which caused a vivid dispute, was the scope of
impeachable acts. In early debates, the delegates essentially agreed
that common crimes, such as treason or murder should trigger the
process of impeachment.32 In his comments on the debates, from July
20, Madison also noted references to "malpractice and neglect of
duty."33 Madison himself argued:
"He [the chief Magistrate] might lose his capacity after his
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a
scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers.... In the case of the Executive Mag-
istracy which was to be administered by a single man, loss of
27. Ferrand, supra n. 25.
28. Madison favored the concept of giving the Supreme Court the final voice in
the proceeding but this idea was objected by Gouverneur Morris. Madison believed
that the President will be too dependent on the excesively powerful Senate if this
chamber will be granted the right to try him. In the final vote on impeachment only
Virginia and Pennsylvania dissented, see, Ferrand, supra n. 23, at 552-53; see also
Gerhardt, supra n. 16, at 7. Hamilton in The Federalist Papers presented also main
arguments against granting the Senate power to impeach. 65-66, supra n. 3, at 396-
407.
29. Ferrand, supra n. 25, at 69.
30. Ferrand, supra n. 25, at 552.
31. Id.
32. See Gerhardt, supra n. 16, at 8.
33. Ferrand, supra n. 23, at 64.
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capacity or corruption was more within the compass of prob-
able events, and either of them might be fatal to the
Republic."34
On August 2 0th , the Convention moved to refer the issue of the scope
of impeachment to the Committee of Five and suggested for discus-
sion the liability of the Officers for "neglect of duty, malversation, or
corruption."35 On September 8, it was moved and passed that the
words "or other crimes and misdemeanors against the State" will be
inserted after the word "bribery."36 In the discussion George Mason
proposed to add "maladministration" to the list of the impeachable
offenses, but he withdrew his motion.37 Finally, the phrase "the
State" was replaced by "United States," but even this phrase was re-
moved by the Committee of Style.38 The definition of remaining im-
peachable offenses, such as "treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors" became one of the most challenging tasks for the
next generations of Americans.
IMPEACHABLE MAGISTRATES-SUBJECTIVE SCOPE OF IMPEACHMENT
When the Framers of the Constitution agreed that, "The Execu-
tive is also to be impeachable, '3 9 they did not define precisely what
"the Executive" means. Gouverneur Morris spoke about the Execu-
tive as the chief "Guardian of the people" and about "great officers of
State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs, etc." who "will
be amenable by impeachment to the Justice."40 The delegates to the
Convention also agreed that the Judiciary would be impeachable. 41 It
was not clear, however, whether other branches of the government,
namely members of the legislature, should be subject to impeach-
ment. The explanation of the scope of the term "all civil officers of the
United States" was left to the practice.
Since the Constitution was adopted, the House formally im-
peached 16 people: 2 presidents, one senator, one secretary of war,
and 12 judges. The proceedings in the Senate resulted in 7 officials
being convicted and removed from office, 6 were acquittals, 2 dismis-
sals and 1 proceeding being suspended had never been completed. 42
In fact, the number of impeachment cases in the United States is not
34. Id.at 65-66.
35. Id. at 337.
36. Id.at 545.
37. Id. at 550.
38. Id. at 551 and 600.
39. Morris' statement of July 19, see Ferrand, id. at 53.
40. Id. at 53-54.
41. Id. at 66.
42. Gerhardt, at 23, for full list see footnotes 3-7; Van Tassel & Finkelman, supra
n. 19, at 1.
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abundant enough to explain all the problems or questions that were
left unclear or unanswered.
With regard to the impeachment of the Senators, the Convention
members and particularly James Wilson, expressed reservations as
to their impeachability. 43 In response to the inquiries of the mem-
bers of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson explained
that the exchange of one third of the Senators every second year suffi-
ciently guarantees their political responsibility. 44 During the discus-
sion of the impeachment in Pennsylvania, John Smilie also raised
that the opportunities for Senators to impeach their colleagues would
be weak and that subjecting them to impeachment would work
against the basic concept of equal treatment. 45 On the other hand,
Hamilton, in his letter published in Federalist No. 66, stated that the
Convention "might also have had in view the punishment of a few
leading individuals in the Senate."46 The history of the United States
has provided only limited clarification about the problem of the ex-
tension of impeachment to the members of the legislature. The single
case of Senator Blount was dismissed by the Senate vote 14 to 11 for
lack of jurisdiction.
William Blount, a frontier man, politician, and businessman,
was appointed by George Washington, in 1790, as governor of the ter-
ritory of the U.S. south of Ohio river. In the late nineties, he founded
the city of Knoxville in Tennessee and began representing this State
in the U.S. Senate. At the same time, he began conspiring to arrange
a military expedition that would seize New Orleans in Louisiana and
the Floridas (then the Spanish territory) and then turn them over to
Great Britain. On July 3, 1797, President John Adams revealed
before the U.S. Congress Blount's handwritten letter as evidence of
his intention to gain financial benefits from his efforts on behalf of
Great Britain.47 The House voted to impeach Blount, and without
any formal process completed in this chamber, the Senate voted 25-1
to summarily expel Blount on a charge of "high misdemeanor entirely
inconsistent with his public trust and duty."48 Apparently, this deci-
sion would not block Blount from seeking a re-appointment, 49 but he
decided to run for the State Senate instead. In the meantime, the
House prepared the articles of impeachment and the federal Senate
began Blount's trial in December 1798. The major issues were listed:
43. Ferrand, id., at 68; check more comments on this by Gerhardt, supra n. 16, at
18 f. 43.
44. Gerhardt, id. at 18.
45. Id.
46. The Federalist Papers, at 406.
47. Van Tessel & Finkelman, supra n. 19, at 87.
48. Id.
49. In accordance with Art. I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, the Senators
were chosen by the Legislatures of the State; the direct senatorial elections were in-
troduced by Amendment XVII, ratified in April 8, 1913.
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whether an individual, no longer in office, can be impeached and
whether a senator is an officer of the United States. Blount himself
claimed that the "civil officers" are only those appointed by the Presi-
dent.50 The Senate voted on January 10, 1798, to dismiss the resolu-
tion that a senator is a "civil officer," and four days later it dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.51 This trial created precedent that
seems to limit the scope of impeachable subjects to the members of
the executive and judicial branches; whether the Blount's case re-
solved the problem sufficiently still remains a matter of debate. 52
The impeachment against persons "no longer in office" has been
discussed in two judicial impeachments: the 1873 case of Federal
Judge Mark H. Delahay and 1926 case of Illinois District Judge
George W. English. The articles of impeachment against Delahay
charged him for improper personal habits exhibited while on the
bench. Delahay, however, resigned and no further action was taken
by the Senate.53 Similarly, in the case of Judge English, charged for
abuse of power, favoritism and tyrannical and oppressive behavior,
the substantial majority of the House (306-62) voted for the impeach-
ment but the Senate decided to dismiss charges (70-9) after English's
resignation.54
The 1876 trial of Secretary of War William W. Belknap was more
complicated and provoked significant concern that a defendant may
escape the punishment through resignation. On March 2, 1876, Bel-
knap, warned by the friend about the possibility of impeachment,
submitted his resignation from the Cabinet of President Ulysses S.
Grant. Although several Senators were concerned that the chamber
would not have jurisdiction over the person not in office, the majority
(37-29) voted in favor of Belknap being guilty of bribery charges. Still,
the Senate did not reach the required two-third majority and Bel-
knap was acquitted.55 The overlapping reservations as to Belknap's
guilt and procedural impropriety of the impeachment did not allow
for a decided resolution of the issue of the scope of Senate's jurisdic-
tion over the persons no longer in office.
50. Annals of Congrss, 1 (1798 [1798-1799], 2270-2272; see also Gerhardt, supra
n. 16,at 48. For summary of the argument of Delaware Federalist James Bayard,
speaking against Blount's defenses, see Buckner F. Melton Jr. in, The First Impeach-
ment: The Constitution's Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount (1998) at
209-15. Melton's book is most exhaustive examination of the Blount's case.
51. When the trial was still pending, Blount, who was elected and who later pre-
sided in the state Senate in Tennesseee, was himself involved in the impeachment of
a state judge. Van Tassel & Finkelman, supra n. 19, at 87.
52. See Gerhardt, supra n. 16. See also conclusions of St. George Tucker, Black-
stone's Commentaries (ed.), App., 803, at 335; see also comments of R. Berger who
seemed to be less convinced that the issue of impeachability of Sentors was finally
decided; Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1973), at 214-23.
53. Van. Tassel & Finkelman, supra n. 19, at 119-23.
54. Id. at 144-52.
55. Id. at 191-98.
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The case of President Richard Nixon provoked an even larger
controversy. In March 1974, Nixon was confirmed by a federal grand
jury as an "un-indicted co-conspirator" in the Watergate investigation
triggering the decision of the Supreme Court to order Nixon to turn
over the tapes as evidence of the White House cover-up. The at-
tempts to "censure" the president rather than to impeach him failed
and the Judiciary Committee of the House recommended to the full
chamber the impeachment on the charges of "obstruction of justice,
abuse of powers, contempt of Congress (refusal to obey the subpoena
of the House)"; two other charges of "income tax evasion and Cambo-
dia bombing" were dismissed. 58 Losing support of his own party in
the Congress, Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. In addition, prior to
the eruption of the Watergate scandal, it was revealed that Vice-
President Spiro T. Agnew was under investigation on the charges of
bribery, extortion, tax fraud and conspiracy. Agnew resigned and in
accordance with Amendment XXV Section II of the U.S. Constitution,
Nixon nominated Gerald R. Ford as his successor. After Nixon's res-
ignation, Ford as the new President, on September 8, 1974, pardoned
Nixon for all federal crimes. The full House had never decided on the
impeachment articles prepared by the Judiciary Committee. The pre-
cedent that officials "not in office" are not impeached had not been
broken, and the question whether they are "impeachable" remained
unanswered.
IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES
Treason is a constitutionalized crime in the United States and
bribery is relatively well defined by the judiciary. Article III Section
III of the Constitution reads: "Treason against the United States
shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court."
In Allen v. State,57 the Court defined bribery as "the offering, giv-
ing, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of
influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or her pub-
lic or legal duties." The federal statute states that "any direct or indi-
rect action to give, promise or offer anything of value to a public
official or witness, or an official's or witness' solicitation of something
of value is prohibited as a bribe or illegal gratuity."58
The meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is more contro-
versial. As the courts declined to define this term for the purposes of
56. Id. at 259.
57. 63 Okl.Cr 16, 72 P.2d 516, 519; see also, State v. London, 194 Wash. 458, 78
P.2d 548, 554.
58. 18 US.C.A. # 201.
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the impeachment process, its interpretation was left to the cases of
impeachment and opinio iuris. As "crimes and misdemeanors" are
well defined by criminal law, the essential problem was to determine
what the word "high" means. As Jon Roland wrote: "It does not mean
"more serious." It refers to those punishable offenses that only apply
to high persons, that is, to public officials, those who, because of their
official status, are under special obligations that ordinary persons are
not under, and which could not be meaningfully applied or justly pun-
ished if committed by ordinary persons."5 9 This comment, however,
does not sufficiently clarify the meaning of "high," as the terms "high
persons" or even "public officials" are not precisely determined.
It also does not answer the questions, whether the common
crimes such as perjury or murder, should be included into the group
of "high offenses," or whether "impeachable acts" include only "seri-
ous abuses of power."60 The first issue deals with "criminality" as
condition sine qua non of impeachable acts, whereas the second issue
tackles the problem of "political flavor" of the impeachable offenses.
In fact, both questions -hardly can be unequivocally answered on the
basis of examination of impeachment cases. For example, Richard
Nixon's lawyers claimed that the term "crimes and misdemeanors"
encompasses only "indictable crimes" and not general "misbehav-
ior".61 On the other hand, it was claimed that the judges hold their
positions "during good behavior"62 and that they may be removed for
official misconduct which might not be criminal in its nature. In
1913, Chief Justice Taft, in his address to the American Bar Associa-
tion stated, "By liberal interpretation of the term 'high misdemean-
ors' which the Senate has given there is now no difficulty in securing
removal of a judge for any reason that shows him unfit."63 This posi-
tion was strongly upheld by Gerald Ford in his speech supporting im-
peachment of Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas in 1970.
Ford referred specifically to the case of U.S. Judge Halsted L. Ritter
who was impeached in 1936 for misconduct but not clearly for crimi-
nal activity.64 In response to Ford, Representative Paul N. McClos-
key emphasized that because of special constitutional commitments
of the judges, their misbehavior amounts to "the highest crime".65
59. J. Roland, "Meaning of High Crimes and Misdemeanors," Website of Constitu-
tion Society, http://www.constitution.org/cmt/high-crimes.htm.
60. For more comments on this issue see, Van Tassel & Finkelman, supra n. 19,
at 7.
61. "An Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Presidential Impeachment,"
quoted after Van Tassel, id. at 6.
62. The U.S. Constitution, Art. III Sec. I.
63. Quoted by Merrill Otis, "A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?," 7 Kan.
City L. Rev. 3, 22 (1938); quoted also by R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional
Problems (enlarged edition 1974), at 61 n. 16.
64. Ford's speech was published by Van Tassel, at 56-60.
65. McCloskey quoted in his speech Memorandum of Dykema, Wheat, Spencer,
Goodnow & Trigg, submitted in Ritter's case, id. at 60-61.
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The problem of "impeachable offences" of the highest elected pub-
lic officials surfaced with particular strength during President Bill
Clinton's 1998-impeachment proceeding. Clinton was charged for
obstruction of justice by "providing false and misleading testimony
under oath in a civil deposition before the grand jury; withholding
evidence and causing evidence to be withheld and concealed; and
tampering with prospective witnesses in a civil lawsuit and before a
federal grand jury."66 The minority counsel for the committee, Demo-
crat Abbe Lowell, claimed that impeachment requires especially high
standards because "it nullifies the Popular Will." He maintained that
purely private behavior does not justify impeachment that can be
started only for political offenses. 67 The House of Representatives re-
jected this assertion and decided to include within the articles of im-
peachment two acts: obstruction of justice and perjury. The
prevailing tone of the discussion in the chamber did not indicate any
tendency to apply different standards to judges and other public offi-
cials. Clinton's acquittal by the Senate proved again that there is no
unequivocal definition of impeachable offenses. The issue of "crimi-
nality" of the impeachable acts has not been clearly answered, espe-
cially with regards to non-judicial officials whose terms are limited
and who do not serve exclusively "during good behavior."
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The scope of the executive power is not precisely determined by
the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution does not refer to the Pres-
ident's immunity from the judicial process.68 Nevertheless, the prob-
lem was addressed several times by the American courts. Most of
these cases stemmed from efforts to interpret the separation of pow-
ers principle under the Constitution.69 In several others cases the
66. See report of David P. Schippers, the majority counsel on the House Judiciary
Committee, on October 5, 1998; published in Van Tassel, op.cit. at 274-87.
67. Id. at 288-302.
68. See, G.R. Stone, L.M. Seidman, C.R. Sunstein, & M.V. Tushnet, Constitu-
tional Law (1991), at 397.
69. Several major cases involved four American Presidents; Abraham Lincoln
[Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.2 121 (1866)];
Franklin Roosevelt [Panama Refining Co.v.Ryan,293 U.S. 388 (1935), A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp.v. United States 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Carter v. Carter Coal
Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936), NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp. 310 U.S. 1 (1937)];
Harry Truman Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)]; Richard Nixon,
[New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), United States v. Nixon 418
U.S. 683 (1974), Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975), Nixon v. Administra-
tor, General Services Administration, 443 U.S. 425 (1977). As Norman C. Thomas
and Joseph A. Pika wrote, "The fact that courts have struck down actions of the presi-
dent as unconstitutional in only eleven major cases in more than 200 years indicates
their reluctance to do so, especially in times of foreign and military crisis." The Polit-
ics of the Presidency (4 th ed. 1997) at 317; for more extensive analysis of case law see,
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courts' holdings resembled common law decisions; 70 the judges inter-
vened to protect the public interest in an on-going criminal prosecu-
tion or to define the rights of public officers in private suits for
damages. Most of these cases are of great importance for the determi-
nation of the public officials' scope of immunity. The courts had to
answer several fundamental questions, such as: Are the impeach-
ment decisions subject to judicial review or presidential veto? Can the
courts issue injunctions against the President? Can a person be in-
dicted before the conclusion of impeachment? Can the President be
judicially punished before his removal from office? To what extent
would the acquittal by the Senate in its impeachment proceeding be
binding for the criminal courts? Does presidential immunity extend
to civil suits? Is presidential immunity different than immunity of
other public officers?
The first question has its answer in the Constitution itself: which
states clearly that "the House shall have the sole power of impeach-
ment"71 and "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all im-
peachments." 72 The only judicial input into the impeachment process
is the presidency of the Senate's trials by the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court in the cases against the Presidents; the courts have
never claimed the justiciability of these suits. The same declaration
of the Constitution that Congress is "the sole power" in impeachment
proceedings responds negatively to all concerns that the presidents
would be able to veto the Congressional impeachment decisions and
become judges in their own cases or cases of their subordinates.
The problem of injunctions against the President was resolved by
the judiciary. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Nixon,73
that "the Special Prosecutor [has] explicit power to contest the invo-
cation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence
deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated du-
ties."7 4 The Court declared that "the legitimate needs of the judicial
process may outweigh Presidential privilege" and ordered the Presi-
dent to give the tapes of his discussion with indicted John Mitchell,
Nixon's former campaign manager and Attorney General. It con-
firmed that executive officials are not immune from suits for injunc-
tive relief.7 5
G.R. Stone, L.M. Seidman, C.R. Sunstein, M.V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law, op.cit,
at 359-471.
70. See comments of S.L. Carter on Nixon v. Fitzgerald in "The Political Aspects
of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision," 131
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1341 (1983).
71. Art. I Section 11/5.
72. Art. I Sec 111/6.
73. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
74. 38 Fed Reg. 30738, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805.
75. These suits are well known and commented upon; Marbury v. Madison (5 U./
S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
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As far as criminal liability of public officials is concerned, the
Constitution states that "the party convicted (in impeachment pro-
cess) shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial,
judgment, and punishment, according to law."76 The question if
whether the criminal trial can start before removal of the officer has
not been answered by the courts with sufficient clarity. 7
7
The prosecutors have never gone so far as to claim the right to
indict the acting President.78 The courts showed inclination to con-
firm absolute, although temporary, immunity of the Chief Executive
from criminal liability.79 As the Supreme Court, following the argu-
ment of Justice J. Story, held in Nixon v. Fitzgerald: "The President
cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office. .".."80 The his-
tory did not subject this question to practical testing.,' Neither one of
three impeached U.S. Presidents was indicted by the courts. Andrew
Johnson was not impeached for common offenses. The charges
against him included violating the Tenure of Office Act and the Army
for more comments see, C. F. Abernathy, Law in the United States: Cases and Materi-
als (1995), at 232. The American courts, followed the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution and distinguished the position of the Executive in the United States
from immunities of the British Crown. As Wade and Bradley wrote, "The remedies of
injunction and specific performance are not available (in England), as the Crown, i.e.
Ministers, cannot be committed for contempt of court, the method of enforcing these
remedies against ordinary personal dependents." Constitutional Law, op.cit at 189.
76. Art. I, Sec 111/7.
77. With regard to this issue neither the Framers' intent is clear or the structural
analysis of the Constitution gives clear-cut answer to this problem. See Griffin, "Pres-
idential Immunity from Criminal Process: Amateur Hour at the Department of Jus-
tice," 5 Wid. L. Symp. J. at 63-64 (2000).
78. For more comments see, Miller, "Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton
Sex Scandals,"22 Harv.J.L. &Pub.Pol'y (1999) 678 and ff.
79. Summarizing arguments in favor and against pre-impeachment criminal
prosecution, Miller wrote, "Opponents of presidential immunity from pre-impeach-
ment prosecution argue essentially that the president is not above the law and must,
like any citizen, be accountable to society's standards of minimum conduct ..... Advo-
cates of immunity argue that a prosecutor should not be empowered to disable an
entire branch of government. . ." id., at 679. See also Turley, "From Pillar to Post":
The Prosecution of American Presidents," 100 W. Va L.Rev. 493 ( 1997). For com-
ments on the immunity of the President from both state and federal prosecution see,
King, "Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President be Criminally Indicted?" 30
"Sw I.L. Rev. 417 (2001) 424-425.
80. In fact, Justice Story wrote that the president should be deemed immune "in
civil cases at least," but the reference to arrest or imprisonment suggested that most
likely he would be inclined to extend the liability beyond "the court contempt" cases.
See, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); see also 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States. (1t ed. 1833) at 418-19.
81. The level of uncertainty and confusion is well summarized in the opinion ex-
pressed by J.S. Bybee, "Unfortunately, Congress and the courts are wrong: the Presi-
dent -and I suspect, federal judges and other public officials-is not subject to
criminal prosecution until first having been impeached by the House of Representa-
tives and convicted by the Senate. Impeachment is the first remedy for the criminal
acts of a sitting President." '"ho Executes the Executioner? Impeachment, Indict-
ment and Other Alternatives to Assassination," 2 Nexus J.Op, 54.
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Appropriations Act, and undignified behavior in sense of "utterances,
declarations, threats, and harangues" against Congress. His convic-
tion failed to pass in the Senate missing just one vote.8 2 Richard
Nixon was pardoned by his successor Gerald Ford. In the case of
President Clinton, Independent Counsel Robert Ray, who replaced
Kenneth Star, agreed to close the investigation without filing any
criminal charges against Clinton for perjury or obstruction of justice.
In his deal with Ray, Clinton accepted a five-year suspension of his
license to practice law in Arkansas and the obligation to pay a
$25,000 fine.8 3
With regard to other public officers, history gives a different an-
swer. On July 11, 1804, third Vice-President of the United States
Aaron Burr challenged Alexander Hamilton to a duel and killed him.
In 1804 Burr failed to win re-nomination but still had been Vice Pres-
ident when he was under indictment in New York and New Jersey for
murder.8 4 Burr, however, was not impeached.
The case of Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew also confirms the pos-
sibility of pre-impeachment criminal suits against high public offi-
cials. In 1973 Agnew was officially charged for accepting bribes and
for tax evasion.8 5 On October 10, he was fined $10,000 and sentenced
to three years' probation; he resigned from his office shortly before
the announcement of the ruling.8 6
The situation of District Judge Harry E. Claiborne was even
more complicated. In 1986, he began serving his two-year sentence
for tax violations. Claiborne did not resign and planned to return to
office after the completion of the punishment. The House impeached
82. Johnson escaped the conviction by one vote short of the required two-third
majority in his 1868 Senate's trial. See Van Tassel, op.cit. at 221-52.
83. N. Hentoff, "Clinton's Deal: Justice Denied," Voice Store, February 14-20,
2001; Guest editorial: Bill Clinton's last deal," Naples Daily News, January 21, 2001;
"Starr Shines on Clinton's Exit Deal," NewsMax.com January 23, 2001.
84. It is interesting to note that Burr, being himself under indictment, presided
over the Senate impeachment proceeding of Justice Samuel Chase; see Van Tassel,
op.cit. at 13.
85. Constitutional scholar Robert G. Dixon argued that the situation of Vice Pres-
ident is different than the sitting President and that Vice President may be subject to
indictment and prosecution; see, Robert G. Dixon, Jr. "Memorandum from Depart-
ment of Justice Re: Amenability of the President, Vice President and other Civil Of-
ficers to federal Criminal Prosecution while in Office" (Sept. 24 1973). Similar to this,
Solicitor General Robert H. Bork argued also that with exception of the President, all
civil officers of the United States, including Vice President are amenable to the fed-
eral criminal process,; see "Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice
President's Claim of Constitutional immunity," in Re: Proceedings of the Grand jury
Impaneled, Dec 5 1972; Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United
States 9 No. 73-965) ( Oct.5, 1973).
86. Opinio iuris split with regard to criminal liability of a sitting Vice-President
and some commentators required that they will be granted the same type of absolute
immunity as the President. See Long, "How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Leg-
islation Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity," 30 Val U.L. Rev. 283
(1995).
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him and the Senate, in 1986, voted for conviction but rejected (46 to
17 votes) the charges that Claiborne committed "high crimes and mis-
demeanors."87 Another District Judge Alcee L. Hastings was tried in
the court for conspiring to solicit a bribe and was acquitted; he was,
however, impeached successfully in 1989 for lying and fabricating ev-
idence in his criminal trial.88 The acquittal did not block the Judge's
impeachment process.
IMMUNITY FROM DAMAGES PREDICATED ON OFFICIAL ACTS
The scope of the presidential immunity from liability for dam-
ages was also determined judicially. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Su-
preme Court summarized its position in several immunity cases,
such as Spalding v. Vilas,8 9 Pierson v. Ray90 or Scheuer v. Rhodes.91
The Court held that "petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predi-
cated on his official acts."92 The Court refused to specify which ac-
tions of the President's many functions would be purely "official"; the
Court stated only that his immunity extends to "acts within the
'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility" and decided that the
President's action that resulted in dismissal of the defendant (a man-
agement analyst with the Department of the Air Force) from his of-
fice, laid well within the perimeter of his authority. The Court
concluded that the Chief Executive is not "above the law" because the
nation has non-judicial means of control over his misconduct, such as
impeachment, scrutiny of the press, and the ultimate judgment of
history. As Stephen L. Carter observed, "the constitutional analysis
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald leads almost ineluctably to the proposition that
the judicial power of the United States does not include the authority
to punish the President of the United States."93
The Supreme Court showed, however, limited tendency to extend
the Presidential privileges on other public figures in the United
States. The absolute immunity of legislators, working in their official
character, was granted by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Consti-
tution 94 and recognized in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
87. Id. at 169.
88. Id. at 172-180.
89. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
90. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
91. 416 U.S. 232 (11974).
92. Nixon v. Fitzegerald, op cit. at 749.
93. S.L. Carter, "The Political Aspects of Judicial Power." op.cit. at 1343. Carter
argued that the Supreme Court did not pronounce a constitutional rule but issued a
common law decision. He speculated that in this situation the Congress can limit the
President's authority and "legislate to punish him directly" (at 1349). Most likely, this
action would violate the constitutional concept of checks and balances.
94. Art. I, Sec 6/1 of the U.S. Constitution.
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Fund,95 and the scope of immunity of prosecutors and judges has
been addressed in Butz v. Economou.96 The Supreme Court ruled on
the immunity of congressional aids in Gravel v. United States97 decid-
ing that the protection of the congressional employees is derivative
from the protection of legislators themselves.
As far as executive officers are concerned, the Court in Scheuer v.
Rodes 98 distinguished "the high officials" and "those with less com-
plex discretionary responsibilities." The distinction is at least ambig-
uous. The Appointment Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution99
divides all "officers of the U.S." in two categories of "principal" and
"inferior" officers. In Buckley v. Valeo' 00 the Supreme Court stated,
"[Pirincipal officers are selected by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be ap-
pointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the
Judiciary."1° 1 In Morrison v. Olson,10 2 the Court again referred to
the distinctions between two classes of officers but noted that "[the]
line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from
clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should
be drawn."'u 3
Despite this ambiguity with regard to shared control of appoint-
ments, the Court confirmed that the removal power, except for im-
peachment cases, is reserved solely for the Executive Branch. 10 4 The
President's discretion, the Court added, is not "illimitable"; the of-
ficers may be removed "for good cause," meaning a way that would
not threaten their independence.
95. 421 U.S. 491, (1975).
96. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
97. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
98. 416 U.s. 232 (1974).
99. Art. II, Sec 2 cl.2.
100. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
101. It has been often noted that vesting appointment power into the heads of de-
partments still leaves the effective control over this process in the hands of the Presi-
dents. On the other hand, the courts have independent authority to make
appointments upon the congressional authorization; the courts, however, cannot re-
move officers they appointed. C.F. Abernathy, Law in the United States. Cases and
Materials (1995) at, 256-57.
102. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
103. The Court quoted the comment of Justice J. Story, "In the practical course of
the government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are and
who are not to be deemed inferior officers, in the sense of the constitution, whose
appointment does not necessarily require the concurrence of the Senate", Commenta-
ries on the Constitution (3' ed. 1858), at 397-98.
104. Section V/A of Morrison v. Olson on "Presidential Authority, Id. In fact, the
Congress can vest the power to remove executive officers in higher official, other than
the President. For example, the authority to remove assistant U.S. attorney is vested
in the Attorney General. The President who disagrees with the Attorney General
would have to fire him first. C.N. May & A. Ides, Constitutional; Law, National Power
and Federalism (1998), at 255.
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In Spalding v. Vilas10 5 the Court extended absolute immunity
from civil suits for damages on the heads of Executive Departments
making decisions in the scope of their. discretion. In accordance with
the Court's reasoning, the public interest requires that the high exec-
utive officers be free from restraints other than their inner convic-
tions, which could affect their official conduct. 10 6 In Butz, however,
the Court disqualified the concept of "a blanket recognition of abso-
lute immunity" of all high federal officials; it rejected the assertion of
absolute immunity of the Secretary of Agriculture, but upheld a claim
of "absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in func-
tions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors.'1 0 7
In Harlow v Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of immunity. 108 The Court restated that most presidential aides
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. The Court was reluctant to
give the presidential aids more immunity than was granted to the
Members of Cabinet and rejected the suggestion that it should use
the reasoning from Gravel v. United States and to make the immu-
nity of the Presidential aids derivative from the Immunity of the
Presidents in the same way as the immunity of congressional aids is
derivative from the Congressmen's immunity. 10 9 The Harlow Court
decided that the immunity should be recognized by the courts accord-
ing to the standard that "government officials performing discretion-
ary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 11° Chief Justice Berger, elaborating on the standards of
qualified immunity in the 1974 case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, proposed a
105. 161 U.s. 483 (1896). For further analysis of Spalding's decision see, Williams,
"Temporary Immunity: Distinguishing Case Law Opinions on Executive Immunity
and Privilege as the Supreme Court Tackles an Oxymoron," 21 Nova L. Rev. 977-78
(1997).
106. Spalding v. Vilas, op.cit. at 498.
107. Court's interpretation of the ruling in Butz, presented in Nixon v. Fitzgeralrd,
op.cit. at 747.
108. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
109. Some commentators claimed that the Presidential aides' have to some extent
an absolute immunity, which is derivative from the constitutional immunity afforded
to the President. This position, however, does not take us far enough to break a 'vi-
cious circle' of immunity doctrine. In fact, linking the aides' immunity with the presi-
dent's privilege means only making ambiguity of the position of other executive
officers derivative from the ambiguity of the powers of the Chief Executive. In con-
trast to the immunity of legislators, the President's immunity is not covered directly
by any constitutional clauses. It still leaves for the courts the task of determining the
immunity of the President and his subordinates from constitutional traditions (not
directly from constitutional principles) or from the common law standards. For more
comments see, Schechter, "Symposium: Separation of Powers and the Executive
Branch: The Reagan Era in Retrospect: Immunity of Presidential Aides from Crimi-
nal Prosecution," 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 779 (1989).
110. For further references to these standards, see Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555, (1978); and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 322, 95 S. Ct., at 1001.
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three-fold test under which the courts would have to check whether
the official worked 1) in the scope of authority, 2) within the range of
discretion linked to the holder of such office, and 3) in conviction that
the action is lawful.'11 In Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald the Court confirmed that a "good faith" qualified immunity, 112 is
contingent on whether the official knew or should have known that
the action is one in which the "the law forbade the conduct."" 13
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUBORDINATES
All above case law does not directly address the scope of respon-
sibility of the higher executive officers for criminal acts or omissions
committed by the subordinates. The courts focused on their immu-
nity rather than on their responsibility, assuming correctly that, in
fact, both issues are interrelated and it is quite obvious that the of-
ficers' accountability lies beyond the area covered by limited or abso-
lute immunity. It is also unquestionable that, even in the area of
responsibility, the President (in accordance with Art. II Sec. 2, #1)
has right to pardon any offenses (except in cases of impeachment)
committed by his subordinates. It remains a question, however, what
other common law principles, besides the doctrine of immunity and
the President's clemency power, may determine the limits of respon-
sibility of superiors for the inferior officers' acts?
The response to this question tackles two issues. The first one
goes beyond the scope of this article and involves the review of the
customary international law doctrine of command responsibility.
This doctrine allows delegating authority to subordinate military
leaders but also determines the limits of reasonable control and re-
sponsibility of superiors for results of the actions. 1 4 It extends to all
commanders, including the U.S. President as Commander in Chief.
This article focuses on the second issue related to the limits of
political responsibility for the acts committed by executive subordi-
nates of the U.S. President. With regard to this problem, the courts
usually emphasized the President's power to control subordinates
and reluctantly addressed the scope of his accountability for all ad-
ministrative actions. The commentators usually focused on a two-
fold aspect of the executive responsibility. On the one hand, it is
clear that political leaders should not escape responsibility for acts
111. Scheuer v. Rhodes, op.cit. at 250; see also Williams, "Temporary Immu-
nity:. . ." op.cit at 983.
112. Nixon v Fitzgerald, op.cit. at 746.
113. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, id.
114. See Smidt, "Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Comand Responsibility in Con-
temporary Military Operations," 164 Mil. L. Rev. 155.; see also Bantekas, "The Con-
temporary Law of Superior Responsibility," 93 A.J.LL. 573 (2000).
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committed by "faceless bureaucrats;" 115 on the other hand, it is
equally obvious that the rise of the administrative state complicated
the concept of responsibility vested in any single executive person.
The final authority doctrine combined with the President's supervi-
sory powers seems to shed some light on the problem.
The prevailing opinion is that Article II of the Constitution
places the "[t]otality of executive power with the President"116 and
basically derives his responsibility for the subordinates' acts from his
unique right of appointment and exclusive right of removal of the ex-
ecutive officers. The President, however, cannot participate in all ac-
tions taken even by his closest subordinates, such as members of the
Cabinet. As Harold H. Bruff correctly observed, "[h]is (President's)
responsibility, then is generalized.. .the President's relationship with
the agencies is basically one of oversight. ."17 In fact, it determines
that the President's accountability for the totality of administrative
decisions is of a political nature only, one which can be enforced solely
through impeachment and through periodical elections. The commen-
tators observed that the scope of the President's accountability varies
and depends on the level of aggressiveness of the Presidential control
over subordinate agencies. The increase of the President's regulatory
power contributes to the wider responsibility for subordinates deci-
sion. 118 To conclude, the chain of responsibility in the presidential
system is quite different than that in a parliamentary government.
As Alexander Hamilton observed in comparing the British system of
collective administrative responsibility with the American concept of
individual responsibility:
"... in a republic where every magistrate ought to be personally
responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British
Constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to ap-
ply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Brit-
ain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the
Chief Magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the
national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it
would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself."119
115. See, Rivkin Jr. "The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive
Branch Rulemaking," 7 Admin L.J. U. 309 (1993).
116. Id.
117. A Symposium on Administrative Law; 'The Uneasy Constitutional Status of
the Administrative Agencies", April 4, 1986: Part II: Presidential Oversight of Regula-
tory Decisionmaking: Principal Paper: On the Constitutional Status of the Adminis-
trative Agencies," 36 Am.U.L.Rev. 509 (1986).
118. Id. at 510.
119. The Federalists, No. 70, op.cit. at 429.
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IMMUNITY FROM PRIVATE CIVIL SUITS
The question of whether the presidential privilege extends to pri-
vate civil suits not related to official functions of the executives was
raised by the courts during the Clinton Affair. 120 Before Clinton,
three other Presidents had civil litigation pending at the time when
their presidency was inaugurated. Theodore Roosevelt's suit started
in New York in 1895, and was pending during his vice-presidency
and when he later became president in September 1901, after assas-
sination of William McKinley. The suit ended on August 5 1904 when
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 121 The suit
against President Harry Truman 122 was dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in 1946, a year after he took presidency. The suit
against John F. Kennedy for injuries caused by a car leased and used
during his campaign was also pending when he became president,
and was subsequently settled. 123
The 1997 Paula Jones case against President Clinton was the
first one in which the courts discussed whether the president's tem-
porary immunity1 24 extends to all civil lawsuits. In fact, Clinton's at-
torneys were not asking for immunity but for deferral of the suit until
the end of the President's term.1 25 The district courts did not confirm
the President's immunity from the suits arising from acts prior to his
presidency, but stated that the president while in office should focus
on public matters rather than on his defense from the civil chal-
lenges. The court of appeals rejected this argument and Clinton
asked the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and stated that such litigation would not be an encroach-
ment of judicial power into functioning of the executive and would not
"place unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the
performance of his official duties." Justice Stevens, delivering the
opinion of the Court wrote, "That assertion (of President's immunity)
finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of
120. For more arguments that sitting presidents should not be subject to civil liti-
gation, see Alexander, "Comment: In the Aftermath of Clinton v. Jones: An Argument
in Favor of Legislation Permitting a Sitting President to Defer Litigation," 28 Sw.
U.L. Rev. 71 ( 1998); see also Kasten, "Clinton v. Jones' Impact on the American Presi-
dency," 51 Ark. L. Rev. 551 (1998); Williams, "Temporary Immunity: Distinguishing
Case Law Opinions on Executive Immunity and Privilege as the Supreme Court tack-
les an Oxymoron," 21 Nova L. Rev. 969 (1997).
121. Kasten, 'Summons at 1600: Clinton v. Jones' Impact on the Americann Presi-
dency," 51 Ark. L. Rev. 561 (1998).
122. The plaintiff claimed that Truman as a judge improperly committed the plain-
tiff to a mental institution.
123. Id.
124. G.T. Williams argued that Clinton v. Jones suit was actually about the exten-
sion of the President's privilege rather that on the recognition of the President's right
to temporary immunity, id. at 73; see also Kumar Katyal, "Executive Privilege and
the Clinton Presidency; The Public and Private Lives of Presidents," 8 Wm. & Mary
Bill of Rts.J. 677 (2000).
125. Clinton v. Jones (95-1853), 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in the rel-
atively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular
case.' 26 The decision provoked a prolific public debate in which it
was often claimed that the message sent by the Court in the Nixon v.
Fitzgerald and Clinton v. Jones cases was not unequivocal enough
and that the scope of the President's civil liability should find its reso-
lution in the legislative action of Congress. 127
CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESIDENT
Throughout U.S. history Congress frequently condemned its own
members. 2 The question, however, whether the Chief Executive of
the United States can be reprimanded by Congress remains unan-
swered. It surfaced first time in 1800, during the presidency of John
Adams, after he intervened in a deportation case; the House of Repre-
sentatives attempted to censure him but failed.' 29 The problem was
revisited by Congress during the second term of President Andrew
Jackson. Re-elected in 1832, Jackson was convinced that the Bank of
the United States worked against him. He vetoed the re-charter of
the Bank, fired the Secretary of Treasury, William J. Duane, and in
his place appointed Roger Brooke Taney. President Jackson ordered
Taney to transfer public deposits to several local banks thus involv-
ing himself in a battle with the Senate that ultimately concluded
with a resolution condemning the President's conduct. The censure
did not have a practical impact on Jackson's presidency, as the Sen-
ate did not vote to remove him from office. 130 The President pro-
tested, however, claiming that the censorship was an act that
violated his executive privileges. He further contended that the pro-
cedure originated in the Senate, not in the House of Representatives,
and that he was prosecuted without the concurrence of the other
chamber, 13' in violation of the Constitution. In a show of acquies-
126. In the ruling the Court referred also to other suits, such as: Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
127. Alexander, "Comment: In the Aftermath of Clinton v. Jones: An Argument in
Favor of Legislation Permitting a Sitting President to Defer Litigation," 28 Sw. U.L.
Rev. 1998) 72. For earlier comments on the legislative regulation of the Presidential
immunity see, Long, "How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establish-
ing the Extent of Presidential Immunity," 30 Val U.L. Rev. 283 (1995).
128. In the recent times such actions has been taken in 1979 against Rep. Charles
Diggs; in 1980, against Rep. Charles Wilson; in 1990, Sen. David Durenberger; in
1990, against Barney Frank; in 1991, against Sens. Alan Cranston, Dennis DeCon-
cini, John Glenn, Johgn McCain; in 1991 against Sen. Alfonso D'Amato; in 1997
against House Speaker Newt Gingrich. See, D. Phinney, "Congress Consiiders Op-
tions" ABC News.com, Dec. 17, 2000, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/
censure091698.html.
129. Id.
130. See comments by Van Tassel, op.cit. at 205.
131. Jackson's protest published by Van Tassel, op.cit. at 212.
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cence, on January 16, 1837, the Senate decided to expunge the resolu-
tion from its record.
The "experiment" with President Jackson did not prevent the
House of Representatives from reprimanding President John Tyler in
1842 for vetoing a tariff bill and for use of inappropriate language
within the President's veto message. 132 The House Committee sug-
gested condemnation of the President for numerous vetoes that
blocked the "whole action of the Legislative authority of this
Union. ' 133 In 1846 both chambers of the Congress condemned Presi-
dent James K. Polk for provoking Mexican-American conflict.134 In
1862, the Senate debated, without any conclusions, the possibility of
reprimanding former President James Buchanan for failing to pre-
vent the Civil War.1 35 In 1864, the Senate passed a resolution con-
demning President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton for signing the agreement allowing Francis P. Blair, at that
time also a member of the House, to hold commissions in the Army.
The Senate passed the resolution and referred it to a special commit-
tee for further investigation; the committee, however, ended the
case.1 36 Another attempt to censor Richard Nixon for "negligence
and mal-administration," suggested on August 2, 1974 by Represent-
atives Paul Findley of Illinois and Delbert L. Latta of Ohio, failed.1 37
During the Clinton investigation, numerous resolutions suggesting
censure rather than impeachment were submitted to the 10 5th Con-
gress during its 2nd Session. For example, on December 17, 1998 Rep-
resentatives Houghton and King introduced the resolution
condemning and censuring President Clinton; it died, however, in
committee. 138 The same fate fell upon Representative McHale's reso-
lution of December 17, 1998,139 and one submitted on February 12,
1999 by Senator Dianne Feinstein.140 As Congressman Robert C.
Scott concluded in his remarks to the Committee on the Judiciary
Consideration of the Censure of the President Clinton, "because co-
equal branches of government should refrain from censuring one an-
132. Id. at 203.
133. House Journal, 2 7 ' Congress, 2 nd Sess.1343-1352.
134. Id.
135. See, D. Phinney, "Congress Consiiders Options," op.cit.
136. "Alternatives to Impeachment: What May Congress Do?," Committee on Fed-
eral Legislation, Dec 10, 1998. http://www.abcny.org/impch98.htm. The Report of the
Committee presents also the list of other case of congressional censure of other civil
officers of the United States.
137. Id. at 200.
138. H.J. Res 139: Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the censure of
William Jefferson Clinton - introduced by Reps. Houghton and King on Dec. 17,
1998, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.J.RES.139.
139. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.J.RES. 140.
140. http://www.conservativenews.org/InDepth/archive/199902/
IND19990212c.html.
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other, and because this might provoke future impeachment inquiries
with flimsy allegations, I cannot support this Resolution."141
It seems that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to
design impeachment as the only instrument that could be used by
Congress against oppressive Presidents. In Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co v. Sawyer 142 the Supreme Court confirmed that the presi-
dential power has its source either in the Constitution or through
acts of Congress. Through legislation, Congress may direct the Presi-
dent's activity; the laws passed by Congress are however, subject to
the presidential veto, but the resolutions are not.143
It is open for discussion whether "resolutions," in which the legis-
lative body merely expresses opinions, are authorized by the Speech
or Debate Clause. Criticism of the sitting president must be, distin-
guished from adopting resolutions with a clear condemnation of the
Chief Executive. Resolutions are acts with specific goals to be
achieved. These goals in the cases of "censorship" are at the very
least ambiguous. It seems that the Framers intended to prevent Con-
gress from intruding into President's constitutional functions; 44 the
separation of powers' doctrine speaks against the interference of one
branch of government in the operation of another branch without a
clear constitutional authorization. 45 Censuring the sitting Presi-
dent would open a Pandora box of questions. What would be a legiti-
mate scope of censure? Can Congress, for example, reprimand the
president for using his veto powers? Can the President be con-
demned for firing a member of his cabinet? Is the congressional reso-
lution of censure different from a bill of attainder, prohibited by Art I
Sec 9/3 of the Constitution? 46 Can the chief of one branch of the
government be exposed for embarrassment without a formal trial?147
141. http://www.house.gov/scott/12-12_98.htm.
142. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
143. See more coments, in Richetti, "Congressional Power vis a vis the President
and Presidential Papers," 32 Dug. L. Rev. 774-75 (1994).
144. As Madison wrote in No. 47 Federalist (op.cit. at 303), quoting from Montes-
quieu, " Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the
violence of an oppressor." "Some of these reasons-wrote Madison about the US Consti-
tution--are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are
here they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated
maxim of this celebrated author."
145. See comments of Kerby Anderson, the president of Probe Ministries Interna-
tional, on September 25, 1998, "Censure?" http://www.probe.org/docs/c-censure.html.
146. Bills of attainder are "legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial" Black's Law Dictionary
(1990), at 165, see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1965).
147. So called "censure plus" agreements suggest that the President will offer a
public apology for his conduct and the Congress will refrain from further penalizing
him. See "Alternatives to Impeachment: What May Congress Do?" Committee on Fed-
eral Legislation, op. cit. Those who criticized the "censure plus" agreements argued
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Is the embarrassment a form of penalty? Is the Congress' alleged
right to censure derivative of the right to impeach? Would a "cen-
sure", as distinguished from impeachment, be subject to judicial
review?148
Although the courts throughout history showed inclination to
protect the President against usurpation by Congress of his constitu-
tional powers, they have never addressed the problem of whether al-
lowing a single house or even both chambers, holding the President
in contempt of Congress has any foundations in the Constitution or if
in doing so would in fact circumvent its provisions. The opinions of
commentators and constitutional experts split on the legality of the
president's censorship. As the Committee on Federal Legislation
reported:
"Some advocates of impeachment have argued that any lesser
sanction than impeachment and removal from office is unconstitu-
tional or extra-constitutional and that the impeachment power is
Congress' sole means to address Presidential misconduct. Other au-
thorities have concluded that the Constitution is sufficiently flexible
to permit congressional responses short of impeachment and that
such lesser remedies may best serve the interests of the Nation by
providing an official public condemnation of the President-perhaps
tied to some tangible penalty-while avoiding the drastic step of re-
moving from office a duly elected President."1 49
The Committee concluded that it tried to "embrace multiple
views on this question [consequences of the censure on the separation
of powers], but is in agreement that there may be no single "correct"
answer outside a specific factual context.' u50 This statement basically
confirms that with regard to censure, Congress' position can be deter-
mined if not by law, by practical political considerations. 15 1
that, the Senate does not have any right to force the President to accept a self- incrim-
inating agreement; "a plea bargain is an admission of guilt with respect to the charges
of impeachment," see, Marc Perkel, "Censure is a Bad Idea," http://www.perkel.com/
politics/clinton/censure.htm.
148. Committee on Federal Legislation, in the report issued during the Clinton's
investigation (December 10, 1998) concluded that "Either House of Congress, or both,
may pass a resolution condemning or disapproving presidential conduct" and that
such a resolution would not be subject to judicial review "because the Constitution
leaves the manner of executing the impeachment power exclusively to Congress." In
fact, the Committee seemed to disregard the fact that the impeachment but not the
censure is a clearly constitutionalized procedure. See, "Alternatives to Impeachment:
What May Congress Do?," Committee on Federal Legislation, op.cit. For some argu-
ments against the Congress' power to censure the President, see, Marc Perkel, "Cen-
sure is a Bad Idea," id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See more comments, in Richetti, "Congressional Power vis a vis the President
and Presidential Papers," 32 Dug. L. Rev. 774-75 (1994).
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CONCLUSIONS: POLITICIZATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.
SHOULD THE JUDICIARY GIVE THE CONGRESS CARTE
BLANCHE TO LEGISLATE ON THE SCOPE OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S PRIVILEGE?
William F. Fox Jr., in referring to the Constitution wrote, "Addi-
tional flexibility was written into the document by the deliberate use
of ambiguous language, which could then be subject to interpretation
as conditions dictated."'1 52 On the one hand, this "deliberate ambigu-
ity" was recognized as one of the most glorified features of the Consti-
tution, contributing significantly to its longevity. 153 On the other
hand, it was observed that a distinction between flexibility and un-
certainty of the law is not entirely clear-cut. Without any attempt to
debunk the sacrosanct characteristics of the U.S. Constitution, one
may note that ambiguity or lack of decisiveness of the Framers con-
tributed to the many major constitutional problems of their succes-
sors. The interpretative problems related to the scope of the political
and criminal responsibility of the Chief Executive are the best exam-
ples of this legacy. 154 , In* fact, some of the constitutional problems
would go almost unnoticed until crises, such as the Nixon scandal or
the Clinton affair, proved that they became more serious than ever
expected.
The material collected in this article supports the assertion that
the ambiguities of the Constitution resulted in excessive politiciza-
tion of some processes fundamental for the rule of law. In 1798, dur-
ing Senator Blount's trial, Representative James A. Bayard already
observed that, "Impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political na-
ture. It is not so much designed to punish an offender, as to secure
the State. '155 On the other hand, the Records of the Federal Conven-
tion do not confirm that it was the intention of the Framers to make
152. "Amending the Constitution to Accomplish Social Goals," 1X/3 Social Thought,
3.
153. As Cass R. Sunstein wrote, "Insofar as it deals with presidential power, how-
ever, the American Constitution has proved to be a highly malleable document. With
very few exceptions the constitutional provisions relating to the President have not
been changed at all since they were ratified in 1787. But in the late twentieth century,
these provisions do not mean what they meant in 1787. The Constitution is a legal
document, and it is enforced judicially; but its meaning was hardly fixed when it was
ratified. In particular the contemporary President has far broader powers than the
original Constitution contemplated. It is remarkable but true that large scale changes
in the authority of the President have been brought about without changes in the
constitutional text, but nevertheless without significant illegality." "An Eighteenth
Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World," 48 Ark. L. Rev. (1995) at 1.
154. The Constitution in Art. I, Sec. 6 grants some immunity to the Senators and
Representatives "in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace." It is
an open question, whether the Framers wished to extend the same immunity to the
Presidents and civil officers of the United States. See, Amar & Katyal, "Executive
Privilages and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases," 108 Harv. L. Rev. 702
(1995).
155. Quoted in R. Berger, Impeachment. The Constitutional Problems (1974), at 88.
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impeachment a political tool of Congress against the President. Sim-
ply, the Framers were at a loss trying to define terms such as "high
crimes and misdemeanors." In result, as Gerald Ford claimed in
1970, "[a]n impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House
of Representative considers it to be at any given moment in his-
tory."1 6 Although Ford has been often criticized for his cynical tone
in this statement, he pointedly demonstrated that, throughout his-
tory, Congress was "flexible" enough to impeach presidents for acts
which did not have a purely criminal character. As Ford observed,
"....one of the charges brought against President Andrew Johnson
was that he delivered "intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous
harangues. 157
To name only the most obvious problems identified in this text,
the term "high crimes and misdemeanors" was left for Congress to
define, as the courts recognized that this is a political task by nature.
Congress also tackled the term "civil officers of the United States"
without resolving all of the involved controversies. The question of
federal criminal prosecution of the sitting president also remains un-
answered,158 and the scope of criminal immunity of Vice Presidents
was subject to some scrutiny through history but the opinio iuris di-
vided in attempt to address whether they should be treated differ-
ently than sitting presidents. The problem of legality of the
congressional censorship of the President has never been judicially
resolved and was left for political experiments conducted by
Congress.
Constitutional ambiguities entangled all branches of government
into challenges, which doubtfully can be handled without impacting
the constitutional foundations of the American government. Al-
though Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that "it]here is hardly a politi-
cal question in the United States that does not sooner or later turn
into a judicial one,"1 59 the courts showed a significant restraint in
picking up the issues related to the executive privilege. It was quite
prudent for non-elective judges to realize that their activism should
not extend beyond the regular process of "optimization" of the
constitution.
156. Ford's speech supporting the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Wlliam
O Douglas: is published in E.F. Van Tassel, Impeachable Offenses, op.cit, at 59.
157. Id.
158. King, "Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President be Criminally In-
dicted?," 30 Sw I.L. Rev. 417 (2001), King argues that "While state prosecution of a
sitting President is precluded (on the basis of analysis of McCulloch v. Maryland (17
U.S. 316 (1819)] the federal prosecution question remains unanswered" ( at 425). For
other arguments supporting the position that the sitting President should not be sub-
ject to criminal prosecution, see Griffin, "Presidential Immunity from Criminal Pro-
cess: Amateur Hour at the Department of Justice," 5 Wid 1. Symp. J. 49 (2000).
159. Democracy in America (ed. J.P. Mayer, 1969) at 270.
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In this situation it has been suggested many times that Congress
should find legislative remedies to the political problems which can-
not be resolved by the courts. 160 As S.L. Carter wrote:
"A hypothesis that the Constitution grants broader author-
ity to Congress than to the courts to create remedies against
the President would not be an unreasonable one. For exam-
ple, one might argue that because the constitutional system
places so many express checks on presidential power directly
in the legislative branch, that branch also ought to have spe-
cial authority (if anyone has it) to create new ones."1 61
This author is of an entirely different opinion. Judicial imple-
mentation of the Constitution by interpretation of the constitutional
principles should be clearly distinguished from the judicially given
"carte blanche" to legislative actions, which would write into the Con-
stitution its allegedly necessary components. Judicialization of the
political process, except for extremes going beyond the regular con-
cept of judicial restraint, is a relatively healthy phenomenon supple-
menting the idea of "ruling" with the concept of "law". Politicization
of the "rule of law" is, however, a dangerous tendency leading to the
replacement of stable components of the legal system with those that
stem from purely political concerns. Politicization means mixing con-
stitutional politics with ordinary politics, manipulation of constitu-
tional mechanisms for temporary political goals. This results in the
instability that the fathers of the concept of divided government
feared most.
As discussed above, the scope of presidential immunity may be
derived from constitutional principle or may be explained as the com-
mon law standard. 162 In both instances, however, the courts are
called upon to determine what is the meaning of the law. The Consti-
tution itself grants the courts power to decide "all cases, in law and
160. See, Alexander, "Comment: In the Aftermath of Clinton v. Jones: An Argu-
ment in Favor of Legislation Permitting a Sitting President to Defer Litigation," 28
Sw.U.L. Rev. 71 (1998) See also Long, "How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Leg-
islation Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity," 30 Val U.L. Rev. 283
(1995).
161. Carter, "The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presiden-
tial Immunity Decision," 131 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1349 (1983).
162. Elaborating on this difference H.W. Chase and C.R. Ducat wrote: "Cases 'aris-
ing under this Constitution' are cases in which the validity of an act of Congress or a
treaty or of a legislative act or constitutional provision of a State, or of any official act
whatsoever which purports to stem directly from the Constitution, is challenged with
reference to it." Chase and Ducat emphasize that the origin ofjudicial review is much
older than the Constitution. "It traces back to the common law, certain principles of
which were earlier deemed to be "fundamental" and to comprise "higher law" which
even Parliament could not alter. Chase and Ducat quote Chief Justice Coke who in
1610 wrote in Bonham's case [8 Reps.107, 118 (1610)], "And it appears that when an
act of Parliament is against common right and reason... the common law will control
it and adjudge such act to be void." Edward S. Corwin's The Constitution and What it
Means Today (1978) at 221.
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equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties.. ,163 and as Hamilton claimed in The Federalist, No.
78, "The interpretation of the law is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts."1 6 4
The U.S. Constitution is not merely a seven-article charter with
twenty-seven amendments; the body of constitutional law was ex-
panded through the subsequent impressive activity of the courts. In
cases not clearly resolved by the Constitution, the judges, bound by
the principle of stare decisis, are in a unique position to provide the
necessary stability for the interpretation of the substance of constitu-
tional law. In contrast, allowing Congress to legislate on the scope of
the executive privilege would subject the Chief Executive to constant
political scrutiny of the legislators, who through legislative measures,
would be able to affect the other branchs' "political life". It would cir-
cumvent the fundamental principle of the presidential system that
guarantees that - with exception of clear constitutional limitations,
namely impeachment, resignation or death-the terms of the legisla-
tive and executive branches cannot be affected by their mutual ac-
tions. As S.L. Carter wrote expressing to' some extent similar
concerns, "legislating is by definition an innovative activity, and any
congressional statute dealing with the executive branch is likely to
circumscribe presidential authority in some manner. If the Congress
can limit the President's authority why can't it legislate to punish
him directly?"1 65
Legislation on presidential privilege results in unnecessary med-
dling with the Constitution. It affects the concept of the presidential
system itself. If Congress can determine through legislation the scope
of the president's executive privilege, it may limit it to the extent that
it would endanger the very grain of the presidential system itself.
The position of the President would not be much different from the
position of the prime minister in parliamentary or parliamentary-
cabinet systems in which the survival of the government is contin-
gent upon on-going support of the parliament. The result might grad-
ually strip the President of some of his most significant constitutional
prerogatives, proving the remedy much worse than the disease itself.
In conclusion, the excessive flexibility of the Constitution re-
sulted in awkward attempts of Congress and more restrained efforts
of the courts to identify the scope of the constitutional prerogatives of
163. The U.S. Constitution, Art. III Sec. II/1.
164. Op.cit. at 467.
165. Carter, "The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presiden-
tial Immunity Decision," op.cit. 1349. In fact, Carter seems to reach himself the con-
clusion that the Congress should take more active legislative role in determining the
liability of the President. He writes "It would be all too easy to leave every issue aris-
ing under the Constitution to judicial resolution, but Nixon v. Fitzgerald is a subtle
reminder that the courts cannot govern along-and that the system's political actors
should not want them too," op.cit. at 1400.
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the Chief Executive. The lack of success contributed to almost "spon-
taneous" extension of the presidential privilege 166 and in final result,
to uncertainty of how far this process may go. The popularity of the
concept of the "living" Constitution dramatically overshadowed the
growing confusion about the actual substance of the "sacrosanct" the-
ory of constitutional checks and balances. The final possibility of
amending the Constitution, being a truly challenging undertaking,
rarely is taken into consideration. Such possibility should not be,
however, disqualified without extensive debate. The need to revisit
the constitutional amendment option becomes more visible in critical
historical moments, such as presidential impeachments or embar-
rassing litigations. Until recently, an existing situation did not re-
sult in a real imbalance of powers in the United States. It stems,
however, more from the political culture of American society than
from the constitutional system of restraints itself. Still trusting that
the political or legal cultures of the people in the twenty first century
will permanently improve the implementation of the country's eight-
eenth century Constitution is overoptimistic and only contributes to
further confusion about the most fundamental constitutional
institutions.
166. See Sunstein, "An Eighteenth Century Presidency..." op.cit. at 12; see also,
Devins, "Congress: Does it Abdicate its powers: Abdication by Another Name: An Ode
to Lou Fisher," 19 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 65.
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